Its not just the NSA: 21st century era of Massive Covert Private Espionage*
The advent of the computer into the sinews of modern society has certainly transformed it, but not in the manner that was previously imagined. The 'rules' and 'moral codes' of the past were unknowingly projected onto the future, without an awareness of how these would actually change with the new technological ecology. As computing has become ever more ubiquitous, first via the 'personal computer' (as opposed to the computational behemoths of the 1960s), then the 'beeper' and now with the smartphone, it has transformed contemporary culture from a 'paper culture' into an 'electronic culture'. Whereas during the colonial period the author wrote on his paper blindly from his heart and mind, not knowing who would actually be reading his books, now the modern era of computing is composed of 2-way reading, even when the reader does not know that he is being 'read' by the author. We have entered the era of covert private espionage at a massive level. Yet its not just the NSA who is spying on its citizenry, but almost 'everyone else' who looks upon other members of their personal collectives.
It is perhaps inherent to the modern digital culture that electrons should flow both ways, as in any closed circuit required for the communication to take place int he first place.
There are many cases and instances, at many different scales and levels, which this private covert spying occurs. Within and between family members, we may observe spying via gift giving. An ambitious jewish nephew giving his aunt a computer that is riddled with spyware, a zealous daughter giving her mother a cellphone to trace her calls or a boyfriend giving his distant girlfriend an iPhone so that he may the authenticity of her virtuous demeanor. All of these 'gifts', which the recipient is more than happy to receive yet utterly blind to their actual purpose, are merely efforts to coercively (unbeknownst to the victim) obtaining a long list of networks and internal thoughts of its purported care recipients. Often these are seen in the context of family inheritances, internecine quarrels, and other instances where 'insider information' will be critical to the eventual outcome of the conflict, and hence so desired by its participants. Despite its limited nature of occurring within the context of a relatively small number of persons, it obviously represent a betrayal to loved ones. They may not have the absolute power that the NSA yields, but it operates at the most intimate and personal level.
They also demonstrate that the human propensity to 'spy' is much more pervasive than usually thought.
The same point might be observed at the political and corporate level. In spite of the fact that the Puerto Rican constitution specifically prohibits phone tapping without a warrant, it has been well known that such 'political espionage' has occurred on a daily basis for many decades now. I have been told of direct cases during the 1970s period, perhaps no differently than what the NSA has been doing secretly all along to a nation so zealous with regards to privacy (for many good reasons). There can also be no doubt that the banking industry is thoroughly imbued with this power. Banks, after all, had to deal with the issues of 'intrusion' from the very beginning of their incorporation of computing resources in the 1960s, for which otherwise they would have lost all their assets. Those who work in the electronics banking industry have noted what might appear to a daily user the absurd number of proxy walls that sit between servers and the other world. Yet, in the real world it is hard to distinguish 'defense' from 'offense', and it is equally clear that banks have also incurred in their fair share of electronic intrusion, though not usually pointed out. (Given the fact that they hold individual's financial flows, such violation would perhaps constitute a complete loss of clientele if it were to appear in the public--and perhaps one of the reasons why bit-coins are so necessary in this electronic society).
It is somewhat apparent now that there was a logistical error in Edward Snowden's reasoning, principally by the fact that 'electronic espionage' occurs in many more sectors and areas of society than we care to imagine. Snowden's main analytical flaw was his presumption with regard to the NSA's sphere of influence. While the NSA might be constituted of the top technological and scientific minds of the United States, it is also equally clear that the sheer scale at which they operated made their mission impossible to achieve. As far as I am aware of, the NSA is basically made up of a building complex. Even if that complex held a total of 10,000 individuals, it would be very hard for these to overlook the electronic transactions of 360 million citizens of the US, and much less the 6 to 7 billion persons of the world. More so, the number is actually exponentially greater when you consider their interconnections. It is perhaps for this reason why it required retention of all that data in some Utah facility: it simply lacks the manpower to truly analyze in 'real time' ALL of the data that gets communicated worldwide in a matter of seconds.
The NSA is a giant walking with a limp leg.
This is an issue that, in my opinion, is erred by most individuals who conceive the issue: the exponential growth of digital information by computers and individuals is so large (including computer to computer) that no single entity has the power to truly handle it 'in real time'. It is for this reason why films pertaining to this activity can only focus on a particular individuals; under this scenario (focusing on an individual), it is certainly the case that the state can act like a bully, and hone in a significant number of resources that will overwhelm the capacity of any single individual to manage, attempting to destroy the life of an individual when they are in full cognizance of the abuse of power of said institution. It is certainly the scariest scenario.
Yet we might also note that there is a huge discrepancy between the NSAs capacity to gather information, and to actually use that information towards legal and/or political purposes. For however much technology they might have available, the NSA simply lacks manpower required to put that information into actual use. As far as I am aware of, there are no NSA external 'brick and mortar' facilities within very city of the United States, and much less the world. Local police forces are usually at a disadvantage when fighting criminals, and although the FBI might certainly have offices in every single metropolitan area, they generally lack the full force of technological expertise found within the NSA. It is said that the NSA does not share information with the FBI directly, although they might do this through anonymous tipping--which is somewhat of a mixed bag as the FBI cannot know prima facie whether the information received (wild as it may or may not be) is valid or simply a distraction to thwart off their limited resources. The NSA might have a lot of potential power, but it does not have the level of absolute power that was described in 1984. Yet.
Perhaps a key question is: 'To what ends?'. Why use this enormous power in the first place? What are the costs and benefits of its use? How will it eventually affect out social fabric, and finally, can it be 'fixed'?
The most obvious benefit is basically the outcome mentioned by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mills father, in Panopticon. If everyone knows they are being watched, they will be in their best behavior. Yet, given that they do not actually know when they are being watched, they will tend to stay in their best behavior even when not being actually monitored. The 'eye of Sauron' keeps everyone under restraint: an apt metaphor for a Victorian prison during an era so concerned with propriety and decency.
It is certainly the case that many actors who would have wanted to commit heinous crimes have not done so because of the threat of 'Panopticon'; utterly unsure that they are being watched, they had to act in a very careful manner. Bankers were perhaps some of the first to know that they were being watched, as they themselves could watch the financial activity of its patrons.
What Bentham's panopticon only takes into consideration a single 'eye of Sauron', rather than the more complex yet actual scenario with multiple eyes operating on various multiple levels with equally varying degrees of 'spying ability' and 'technological prowess'. The NSAs one eye might be able to see all, but precisely due to the fact that it is 'one eye' means' that they can only focus attention on one thing at a time. NSA's 'eye of Sauron' might have the infinite power of 'sight', but (as in the movie) it is limited to where it can actually be at a given moment. History can help elucidate our current communications circumstance
A similar effect had occurred early in the telecommunications era as a result of the 'unsophisticated' nature of early telephone lines. Given that ATT generally tended to be reluctant from establishing telephone lines in rural areas as a result of its higher cost and lower 'returns on investment' scenarios, many small town and farming communities established their own telecommunications services early int he century. Yet a common element of these primitive lines is that they were often 'party lines'--single cables that would be shared by multiple individual. Hence a telephone call would be more akin to 'shouting out' on the streets: everyone would answer, but only 1 would be the intended recipient. However, because everyone else could hear, there would be an intended effect of 'public discussion' in their private conversation: you could never know who was actually listening. Individuals would be made very aware of the public character of their conversation by offhand comments made by others.
The example is helpful because it illustrates one of the key problems in our current telecommunications system: it is laden with the presumption of privacy, but one which is often betrayed by its players. In other words, it is the false illusion of privacy that is a key element to the sense of betrayal felt by so many. The fact that one presumed to have a private conversation but did not removes power from the individual in being able to control how they are perceived by others in the community; via this manipulation of telecommunication, individuals have reduced powers over the manner in which they are to be perceived by others. This is clear when you consider that, if there were an enormous 'party line' all over the world, whoever could talk to it would yield an enormous amount of power--akin to the power held by the three main television stations in the US post WWII era: one to many. Yet, because the many to many quickly becomes chaotic, these need to occur in particularly nested channels. So, while modern telecommunications has a seemingly 'infinite' number of channels, because a huge 'party line' would be utter chaos, the integrity of these party lines are continually subject to intrusion. This, I think, it was bugs most people: the world is other than that which they imagined it to be.
Is this 'good' or 'bad'? Would we be able to resolve it with Steve Gibson's notion of TNO: trust no one, and hence utterly private communications? Maybe.
The NSAs main complaint is that if all data were truly encrypted--'the dark internet'--then they would not be able to prevent foreign attacks. As occurred during the American Revolution of 1776, individuals (internal and otherwise) would be able to plot in order to bring down the empire. Implicit in this view is the notion of moral infallibility: the suggestion that 'we' are acting on the individuals behalf 'for the greater good'. A second notion implicit in this view is the idea of utter technological superiority. Since 'we' have the technological upper hand, it means that whatever spy technologies are in place cannot be undermined by third parties and used against us. Both of these notions are subject to question, both on a 'chronological' and a 'geographical' level.
While the NSA might currently have the technological upper hand, this might not necessarily be the case in the future. As is well known, US scientific and technological expertise has been gradually declining since around 1975, principally because the number of individuals entering science and technology has so drastically declined during this period--to such an extent that the vacuum has had to be filled with foreign students. This is perhaps the inherent flaw of the prosperous society, as noticed by Ibn Kahldun way back when in his analysis of the rise and falls of societies. A cliche might be that, the seed of destruction is inherent in its success, as a sociological level.
We might also point out that the notion of moral superiority is clearly a flawed one. Many, both inside and out, view institutions as single monolithic entities, without taking into consideration the utterly complex social dynamics that occur within these. Individuals, families, cities, societies and institutions are in a constant state of flux, some for the better and others for the worse. There will always be 'bad seeds' in a collective, and it is perhaps this implicit recognition for the rather humorous 'group within a group' dynamics that can be typically observed in 'spy organizations'. Small groups with a high level of trust will be formed to deal with a particular issue simply because if the group is expanded within the same origination, information might leak and ultimately compromise the purported agenda of said group. While the FBI might proclaim moral authority in Puerto Rico, it is certainly the case that there are 'criminal elements' in said organization. Given the enormous power and influence of these organization, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect otherwise.
We may thus conclude that the NSAs vision is inherently flawed; even if it has worked so far, there are no guarantees that the future will hold the same outcomes they have in the past. If the NSAs technological capability is reduced--even if not absolutely but relative to that of other nations--it will find itself in the same place as that of the tech spy agency of El Salvador. El Salvador had established a law giving its spy agency the absolute power of information over its citizenry. But, as pointed out by Julian Assange, its technological deficiencies would only mean that this information would fall int he hands of the NSA.
I think it is safe to say that such an approach is perhaps the one that should be taken over the long run: trust no one, including yourself. You never know if the information that you compile will be used against you in the end--as so clearly shown by Edward Snowden. Steve Gibson's TNO is, in the long run, the best policy available; it is one that should be built into every computing environment that exists (ie cellphones, computers, google eyeglass, etc etc).